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Abstract 
This paper describes local government decision-making in transport in three areas 
of the UK, London, West Yorkshire and Edinburgh, in which major changes in 
local government decision-making structures have taken place over the last 
decade, and between which arrangements are now very different. The research 
discusses whether institutional change has had a beneficial or adverse effect, and 
whether any of the current structures provides a more effective framework for 
policy development and implementation. The results show that although the sites 
share a broadly common set of objectives there are differences in devolved 
responsibilities and in the extent to which various policy options are within the 
control of the bodies charged with transport policy delivery. The existence of 
several tiers of government, coupled with the many interactions required between 
these public sector bodies and the predominantly private sector public transport 
operators appears to create extra transactional barriers and impedes the 
implementation of the most effective measures for cutting congestion. There is, 
however, a compelling argument for the presence of an overarching tier of 
government to organise travel over a spatial scale compatible with that of major 
commuter patterns. The extent to which such arrangements currently appear to 
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work is a function of the range of powers and the funding levels afforded to the 
co-ordinating organisation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Transport policies are developed to manage the social, environmental and 
economic impacts that the increased desire for mobility of society brings 
(Banister, 2000). A number of research studies have attempted to investigate the 
best theoretical combinations of transport policies to meet social, environmental 
and economic objectives (e.g. May et al, 2000; May et al., 2004a). However, the 
application of such policies in real situations remains inconsistent between cities 
and, from a theoretical perspective, sub-optimal.  
 
A number of studies in the field of transport at a national and European level have 
examined organisational issues within transport and barriers to progress (Stough 
and Rietveld, 1997; Docherty, 2000; Pemberton, 2000; and Schade and Schlag, 
2003). The study reported in this paper builds on this work and was part of a 
wider European Union project (TIPP – Transport Institutions in the Policy 
Process) examining why the transport policies we know to be more effective are 
not being implemented (Niskanen et al, 2003, Peter et al, 2005).  
 
The roles of the public and private sector in the UK transportation sector have 
changed substantially over the last 50 years from central government control to a 
system almost exclusively run by the private sector within a framework 
established by central government. The new role of government, combined with a 
growing acceptance of the strong connections between land-use and transport 
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have led to five changes in central government responsibilities for transport since 
1970 (May, 2003). In the same way that central government organisation of 
transport has altered significantly since the 1970s, changes to regional and local 
government structures have also occurred in the UK since the mid 1960s in a way 
unseen in the previous 100 years (Ibid.). The main changes to the central, local 
and regional government that have impacted on transport are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Transport governance timeline 
Year Level Change 
1965 Regional Greater London Council established covering a 
population of almost 8 million with 33 London 
Boroughs pursuing local responsibilities 
1969 Regional Creation of the first four Passenger Transport 
Executives in provincial conurbations 
1970 National Department of Environment created from merger of 
Ministries of Transport, Housing and Local 
Government and Public Buildings and Works 
1974 Local Local government restructured to include six 
metropolitan county councils and mergers of smaller 
rural authorities.  
1975 Regional Regional councils were formed in Scotland with lower 
tier authorities. 
1976 National Department of Transport separated out from 
Department of Environment 
1986 Regional and 
Local 
Greater London Council and Metropolitan County 
Councils abolished and seven Passenger Transport 
Authorities/Executives recreated in provincial 
conurbations 
1986 National 
(local) 
Deregulation of local bus services in the UK outside of 
London 
1994 National Rail privatisation began 
1996 Regional and 
Local 
Regional councils abolished in Scotland with 
responsibilities devolved to unitary authorities 
1997 National Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions 
created by merger of Departments of Environment and 
Transport with added responsibility for regional policy 
1999 National and 
Regional 
Devolution of primary legislative power to Scotland 
and Northern Ireland and secondary legislative powers 
to Wales 
1999 Regional Regional assemblies established 
2000 Regional Greater London Authority formed with a directly 
elected Mayor for London 
2001 National Department of Transport Local Government and the 
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Regions formed with Environment going to a new 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
2002 National Department for Transport formed with Local 
Government, Regional affairs and planning all moving 
to the newly created ‘Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister’ 
2004 Regional Scottish Executive publishes White Paper on reforming 
regional transport structures 
 
The increased complexity of the decision-making environment raises the question 
about the extent to which organisational and institutional reform improves 
decision-making. Research into the effectiveness of changes to organisational 
frameworks in the field of economic development, for example, has questioned 
the effectiveness of new multilevel governance arrangements (Fuller et al., 2004). 
Richards et al. (1999) suggest that “many policy problems will be found not 
within the boundaries of single organisations but on the interface between them” 
(p10). This suggests that more complex organisational arrangements might be less 
effective if the ability to achieve change is dependent on the alignment of several 
common agendas (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994) 
 
This paper presents an analysis of case studies in the three conurbations of 
London, West Yorkshire and Edinburgh in the UK that have undergone 
significant change over this time period and which now have quite different 
organisational structures, powers and responsibilities for transport. It begins with 
a description of the methodology. The three case study conurbations, their 
organisation and objectives are described. A comparison is then made between the 
transport policy tools available at each site and the implementation of these 
policies. This evidence is drawn together to answer a series of research 
hypotheses before conclusions are drawn. 
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2. Methodology  
The approach within this paper is a positivist examination of the current workings 
of the transport arrangements for a given case study. The methodology adopted 
was therefore a mixture of desktop review and interviews with decision makers 
including those outside of local government. The data collected was used to 
answer a number of research hypotheses, established at the outset of the project 
and discussed in Section 7. 
 
The resources available in the study limited the investigation to three cities.  It 
was decided to focus on cities and conurbations which were of at least regional 
significance, since they would be more likely to wish to employ the full range of 
policy interventions.  Since the focus was on the impact of institutional structure 
and process on the development of transport strategy, it was essential to select 
cities which differed in this regard.  The diversity of institutional structures in the 
UK facilitated this, offering seven different structures for the governance of 
transport in regional cities (May, 2003). We selected London, West Yorkshire as 
an example of an English Passenger Transport Executive (PTE), and Edinburgh as 
an example of a city in a devolved government, because they offered a range of 
conditions and had all been subject to considerable change.  The sites also offer 
several important commonalities. Stoker and Mossberger’s expanded 
categorisation of urban regime theory shows the sites to each broadly share 
purpose, motivation of participants and sense of common purpose and to differ 
most strongly in the quality of coalition and relationship with the wider political 
environment (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). The rationale for site selection is 
further discussed in the following section on institutional structure. Despite our 
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careful selection of sites for robust comparison, it is inappropriate to suggest that 
these three sites are representative either of the other types of institutional 
structure or of other cities within their structure.  Any attempt to conduct a 
representative sample survey would have required far more resources than were 
available. 
 
The interviewees were selected through a three stage process. First, a thorough 
review of the literature and policy documents produced for each of the three study 
cities was undertaken (e.g. Greater London Authority, 2001; TfL, 2003; METRO, 
2000; METRO, 2003; City of Edinburgh Council 2000, 2003 and 2004). This 
highlighted a series of important facts and issues and confirmed the key 
organisations and actors to be interviewed in order to cut across the institutional 
layers of interest (May et al, 2004b). Second, relevant individuals were targeted 
and approached for interviews. Those approached were senior enough in the 
organisation to give a rounded perspective of the views of the organisation 
although, by their nature, the outcomes of such interviews can only ever represent 
that individual’s interpretation of those views. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were set up with those organisations willing to 
participate as a third stage1. Semi-structured interviews enabled a series of key 
themes to be explored without restricting the respondents to subject matter 
defined solely by the research team. Interviews were recorded where allowed and, 
when this was not the case, a record of the meeting notes was passed to the 
                                                 
1 The Scottish Executive, at the time, was consulting on changes to organisational structures for 
transport and preferred to use the published consultation documents and consultation responses as 
the evidence base for the project to use. The Scottish Executive was the only organisation that 
refused to be interviewed and this was not therefore felt likely to prejudice the results as the 
rationale for proposed organisational changes had been set out in the consultation documents. 
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participant and agreed as a good reflection of the interview.  The use of an initial 
stage of desk-top research allowed the interviews to be more productive and also 
offered an opportunity to triangulate the arguments of the interviewees with 
official documentation (Docherty, 2000). This process was also used to provide 
some validation of the representative nature of the interviews. 
 
Eleven interviews were held, one with national government (Regional Transport 
Directorate), four with representatives of London (Transport for London, Board 
Member Transport for London, London Transport Users Committee and a former 
member of the Greater London Authority) and West Yorkshire (Passenger 
Transport Executive, A Metropolitan District Council, Government Office for 
Yorkshire and Humber and the Yorkshire and Humber Assembly) and two from 
Edinburgh (City of Edinburgh Council and Transport Initiatives Edinburgh). A 
previous round of interviews for an earlier stage in the project also included key 
stakeholders from the transport sector that interact with each of the three 
conurbations (a national bus operator covering all three cities, the Strategic Rail 
Authority, a national rail company serving all three cities, the Highways Agency 
and an independent consultant with an extensive London government track 
record) (Zografos et al, 2004). 
 
3. Institutional Structure 
In this section we describe the three cities briefly through a comparison of key 
facts and a comparative analysis of institutional structure using Williamson’s 
classification of institutional dimensions: 
• Informal institutions (values, norms, practices, customs, traditions); 
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• Governance institutions (rules on how government operates);  
• Formal institutions (statutes, constitutional provisions, laws, regulations); 
and 
• Actions of actors in the decision environment (management behaviour, 
voting, lobbying). (Williamson, 1985) 
We then compare the cities in terms of the desiderata, as indicated in the European 
Commission’s guidance on sustainable urban transport plans, for horizontal, 
spatial and vertical integration (Wolfram, 2004).  
 
Key Facts 
London has a population of over 7 million with a travel to work area including 
another 5 million approximately. London is the capital of England and located in 
the South East of England. Just over a third of London households do not own a 
car (Greater London Authority, 2005). West Yorkshire has a population of 2.1 
million and is located around 180 miles north of London. 31% of households do 
not have access to a car (National Statistics, 2005). The City of Edinburgh is the 
capital city of Scotland and has a population of 450,000.  It forms part of a larger 
conurbation of some 700,000, including areas of Fife north of the Forth road and 
rail bridges. 40% of households do not have access to a car (Ibid). 
 
Informal Institutions 
There are undoubtedly differences between the cultural identities and social 
attitudes of residents at each of the three sites (as monitored, for example, through 
the British Social Attitudes Survey). Of principal interest to this study is whether 
these differences will influence the likely success of transport policy 
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interventions. There is little evidence upon which to make such an assessment 
(Hendriks, 1999 and Kallionen et al., 2005). In the absence of a robust evidence 
base, our starting point assumption in selecting sites was that cultural differences 
will have only a second order influence on the extent to which different policies 
are implemented at different sites. 
 
Governance Institutions 
In London, the Greater London Authority (GLA) was established in 2000 as a 
result of the 1999 Greater London Authority Act. It is headed by a Mayor and has 
25 politicians, all directly elected (see Rydin et al, 2004 for more details on the 
operation of the GLA). Transport for London was established as an executive 
body of the Mayor alongside the creation of the GLA. Its main functions include 
managing the bus, underground, tram and river service, 580km network of main 
roads, all of London's 4,600 traffic lights and regulation of the taxi and private 
hire trade. Much of the implementation of transport policy still rests at a Borough 
level as the highway authorities with responsibility for around 95% of London’s 
roads by length. The Mayor also has responsibility for planning, economic 
development and the environment.  
 
Since 1986 when the Metropolitan Counties were abolished, West Yorkshire 
comprises five District Authorities, each of which has directly elected local 
authority politicians. Although there is integration across a number of different 
policy areas, the authorities act and are treated as independent for matters such as 
social services, education and leisure. The Metropolitan District Councils are the 
highways authorities for their areas, having direct responsibility for the 
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maintenance of roads and supporting infrastructure including bus lanes, cycle 
paths and footways. A Passenger Transport Authority and Executive exist to 
develop and co-ordinate the provision of public transport services across the 
Districts. The West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) is known as 
METRO. Its activities are funded by the West Yorkshire Passenger Transport 
Authority. The main regional actor is the Regional Assembly, which is currently 
an unelected chamber that develops the statutory regional spatial strategy and 
regional transport strategy. Regional Assemblies are increasingly being given 
responsibility for co-ordinating the direction of funds for major infrastructure 
projects of regional importance (HM Treasury et al, 2005). 
 
In Edinburgh, following the abolition of regional councils in 1996, the City of 
Edinburgh and its neighbouring authorities became unitary district councils with 
sole responsibility for transport and land use planning.  Strategic roads are the 
responsibility of the Scottish Executive, and rail and bus operation are as in West 
Yorkshire, with the exception that the City Council retains part ownership of one 
of the major bus operators, Lothian Buses.  The City of Edinburgh Council has 
established an arms-length company (or Special Purpose Body) to oversee the 
delivery of major transport schemes (Transport Initiatives Edinburgh). A 
voluntary regional partnership (South East Scotland Transport Partnership) exists 
and produces a Regional Transport Strategy. The partnership is eligible to submit 
bids to the Scottish Executive for funding with the implementation being 
conducted by individual local authorities. The recent Scottish White Paper has 
proposed to make these partnerships statutory (Scottish Executive, 2004). 
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Table 2 provides a comparative analysis of the current position in each of the case 
study sites. 
 
Table 2: Tiers of responsibility for transport governance 
Administrative 
Level London West Yorkshire Edinburgh 
UK Government Transport, planning and funding 
Transport, planning 
and funding 
Funding and 
devolution of 
powers2
Devolved National 
Government - - 
Scottish Parliament 
and Executive 
Regional Body Mayor and Greater London Authority 
Unelected Regional 
Assembly 
Voluntary regional 
partnership 
Sub-Regional Body - Passenger Transport Authority/Executive - 
Local Government London Boroughs Metropolitan District Councils 
City of Edinburgh 
Council 
 
 
Formal Institutions 
Many of the laws and regulations for road and public transport are consistent 
across the UK, partly driven by the need for interoperability of vehicles and 
systems across a range of administrative boundaries. One key difference between 
the sites is the extent to which transport strategy needs to be formalised. In 
London, the Mayor has to produce a Transport Strategy (GLA, 2001). Outside of 
London, within England, authorities have to produce Local Transport Plans. 
These are statutory documents, for all local authorities in England outside 
London, setting out policies on all aspects of local transport policy and capital 
expenditure3 (Wootton and Marsden, 2001).4 In West Yorkshire METRO’s 
                                                 
2 The UK Government retains certain rights (through the Strategic Rail Authority) on rail matters 
but most transport and planning responsibilities have been devolved. 
3 Capital expenditure is expenditure on new assets (which can include computerised timetabling as 
well as a bypass) 
4 The local transport plans replace the previous Transport Policies and Programmes submissions 
which were annual bids for funds to implement a package of transport measures (May, 2003). 
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principal policy role is to act as a co-ordinating body with the local highways 
authorities in the metropolitan areas and to jointly prepare, on behalf of their 
constituent unitary authorities the Local Transport Plan (METRO, 2000). In 
Scotland, there is no formal requirement for all authorities to produce a Local 
Transport Strategy. However, as an authority promoting congestion charging at 
the time of the research, Edinburgh was obliged to produce a strategy (CEC, 
2004). Other differences exist in the administrative layer responsible for 
implementing transport measures as well as the organisational framework within 
which the policies are implemented (e.g. the nature of bus regulation) but these 
are discussed in more detail in Section 5. 
 
Actions of actors in the decision-making environments 
The behaviour of decision-makers within the decision-making environments was 
explored through the interviews described in Section 2 to understand the extent to 
which the behaviour of actors influenced the policy development and 
implementation process. Relevant outcomes are reported throughout the paper as 
appropriate. 
 
Integration 
Table 3 assesses the extent to which each current institutional structure meets the 
needs, as highlighted by the European Commission, for horizontal, spatial and 
vertical integration. 
 
Table 3: Degree of integration of institutional structure at each site 
 London West Yorkshire Edinburgh 
Horizontal integration **** ** *** 
Spatial integration **** *** * 
Vertical integration **** *** ** 
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*****  = strong 
*  = weak 
 
Horizontal integration involves the coverage, within a given authority, of all the 
policies relevant to sustainable transport plans.  This is addressed further in 
Section 5.  London comes closest to this requirement, since Transport for London 
only lacks direct responsibility for surface rail and for local parking policy and 
local roads.  Edinburgh covers these latter two, but lacks direct responsibility for 
any public transport.  West Yorkshire is weakest, since the transport (and land 
use) responsibilities are split between the two local tiers of government and the 
private sector. 
 
Spatial integration involves the coverage of all responsibilities within a 
conurbation or travel to work area.  Again, London performs best, although it has 
never proved possible to introduce an administration able to cover the whole of its 
extensive travel to work area (May, 1982).  West Yorkshire also performs well, in 
that the PTE coordinates conurbation-wide planning, and the travel to work area is 
predominantly within its jurisdiction.  Edinburgh has the weakest structure, with 
only informal means of negotiating with neighbouring authorities within the travel 
to work area, and very limited interaction with those in Fife. 
 
Vertical integration encompasses the links between tiers of government, and the 
complexity of those tiers.  The emphasis here is not on unitary responsibilities, but 
on consistent requirements and understanding between the tiers.  In all cases there 
are strong ties between the national and local levels.  The weaknesses arise at the 
 13
regional level, where responsibilities in West Yorkshire, and even more so in 
Edinburgh, are ill-defined. 
 
This analysis demonstrates that the sites were selected primarily for differences in 
levels of integration and governance structure. These institutional elements are 
strongly linked to the complexity of the decision-making environment which was 
identified in Section 1 as being important to effective decision-making. The extent 
to which these and other institutional factors might explain variation in the 
success of different policy interventions is explored in the subsequent sections 
which examine the objectives which each of these cities has adopted, the policy 
instruments which they use and their freedom to use them, and the financing 
streams available to support them. 
 
4. Objectives 
The UK Government's Integrated Transport White Paper specified the following 
set of objectives for the pursuit of its integrated transport policy, and the appraisal 
of local authorities' plans (DETR, 1998):  
• to protect and enhance the built and natural environment; 
• to improve safety for all travellers; 
• to contribute to an efficient economy, and to support sustainable economic 
growth in appropriate locations; 
• to promote accessibility to everyday facilities for all, especially those 
without a car; and 
• to promote the integration of all forms of transport and land use planning, 
leading to a better, more efficient transport system 
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 There is little to choose between the overarching objectives of the three 
conurbations. They are all consistent with the national objectives. Each seeks to 
promote economic growth, improve the environment and safety, reduce social 
exclusion and increase network efficiency. There are some differences in 
emphasis and some other sub-objectives not included above, with Edinburgh 
focusing more clearly on health and the role of streets in improving communities, 
whilst the London objectives appear to be influenced more widely by other policy 
areas such as planning, waste and energy use, areas for which the Mayor also has 
responsibility. 
 
5. Policy responsibilities 
As each of the three conurbations has gone through a different cycle of 
organisational change it would be natural to expect there to be a divergence of 
policy responsibilities at each site. These differences potentially impact on the 
ease of implementation of a range of transport policies. A comparison across a 
large range of transport policy tools is shown in Table 4 with the most important 
aspects reviewed below. 
 
Roads 
In England and Scotland, the Highways Agency and Scottish Executive 
respectively are responsible for routes of strategic national importance. In 
England the Highways Agency has devolved responsibility for many strategic 
routes to the local authorities which provides a more complete control of the 
network by the district councils in West Yorkshire than appears the case in 
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Edinburgh. In London, Transport for London manages the locally important 
strategic routes. 95% of the road network in London therefore remains the 
responsibility of the Borough Councils over which the Mayor is only able to exert 
influence rather than executive powers. 
 
Rail 
The rail system in the UK has, since the early 1990s, undergone more 
organisational change than that in any other country. The rail network was 
privatised between 1994 and 1997 leading to a separation of track provision and 
service provision. Smith et al. (2005) provide a review of the pros and cons of the 
privatisation of the rail industry. On rail, the main decisions have been taken by 
the Strategic Rail Authority in England and, for the local Scottish franchise by the 
Scottish Executive (although negotiations were still conducted by the Strategic 
Rail Authority). In London, the Mayor issues ‘directions and guidance’ to the 
Authority about services but there has been no obligation on the Strategic Rail 
Authority to meet these aspirations. Docherty (2000) provides a thorough 
description of the institutional arrangements and changes to rail organisation in 
the main metropolitan areas outside London in England and Scotland from 1986 
to privatisation.  
 
After privatisation METRO, like all PTEs, was a co-signatory to the local 
franchise agreement and also a co-funder. Subject to its own budgetary 
constraints, METRO therefore exerts greater influence on the rail specification 
than currently occurs in London or Edinburgh. Knowles (1998) notes that, for 
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PTEs and local government, negotiation for changes in service provision became 
increasingly complex following privatisation.5  
 
Bus 
The largest contrast exists between responsibilities for the bus networks. In 
London, services are run according to contracts specifying routes, timetables and 
fares as set out by Transport for London. The private sector bids competitively for 
the rights to run the services. This flexibility has been applied by London for 
social policy purposes: 
 
“Fares have been kept below inflation to stimulate bus use and for wider social 
objectives” (Transport for London, officer) 
 
In West Yorkshire and Edinburgh the bus services are run by private sector 
companies that have the powers to decide on routes, timetables and fares.6  The 
role of METRO and the City of Edinburgh Council is therefore more related to the 
provision of non-commercial, socially necessary bus services.  
 
Local authorities in England and Scotland can apply to the Department for 
Transport and Scottish Executive (respectively) for a ‘quality contract’ to provide 
                                                 
5 The Railway Act 2005 has subsequently introduced a number of further changes to 
responsibilities for rail. In particular, PTEs are no longer co-signatories to franchise agreements 
but have greater freedoms to use subsidy for rail for bus substitution (McNulty, 2005). Service 
levels for the Scotrail franchise are enhanced by subsidy from the Scottish Executive. The 
Strategic Rail Authority is being wound up with the majority of its powers and responsibilities 
transferring to the Department for Transport. None of this latest round of changes has influenced 
the research reported on here. 
6 One difference between West Yorkshire and Edinburgh is that the City of Edinburgh Council 
holds “91 per cent of the issued share capital” of Lothian buses (OfT, 2004, p3). Lothian buses 
runs as an arms length company and is the dominant provider of services in Edinburgh operating 
more than 70% of registered miles within the principal commuting area around Edinburgh (Ibid., 
p12). 
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bus services on a franchised basis (similar to that in operation in London). Section 
124 (1) of the Transport Act 2000 sets out however that for a contracts scheme to 
be acceptable it must be “the only practicable way of implementing the policies 
set out in their bus strategy or strategies in the area to which the proposed scheme 
relates” (TSO, 2000, 124(1)). The conditions imposed for quality contracts have 
been criticised by Parliamentary bodies in both England and Scotland as being so 
restrictive as to make their establishment unlikely (LGTC, 2005, HoC, 2002).  
 
An alternative model for providing better bus services is the quality partnership 
where local authorities make agreements with the bus operators to jointly improve 
the infrastructure and bus fleet. In Leeds, West Yorkshire, the dominant bus 
operator First invested £3.7 million in the infrastructure for two bus priority 
corridors with guided busways in addition to investing in new vehicles. In 
Edinburgh, the Greenways quality bus partnership achieved an estimated 7% 
growth in patronage on the A8 corridor with 10% improvements in reliability 
(TAS, 2002).7  
 
Demand management 
In London, responsibilities for demand management are split between the Mayor 
and the Boroughs. Whilst the Mayor can introduce congestion charging schemes 
without a public inquiry, he has no control over parking policy within the area 
concerned, suggesting possible losses of synergy between the two policies. 
Transport for London can only reallocate roadspace (for example to bus services 
                                                 
7 Those partnerships introduced to date are voluntary in nature with no sanctions against any party 
failing to deliver their part of the proposals. Powers exist for statutory partnerships to be 
established through the Transport Act 2000 and Transport (Scotland) Act 2001. The first statutory 
partnership is expected to begin in Scotland in April 2006 (National Express Group, 2005). 
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and cycle ways) on the strategic network. Boroughs decide on their own policies 
and priorities for management of their road networks and public parking and may 
choose to reflect local rather than strategic priorities.  
 
In West Yorkshire, responsibility for demand management rests almost entirely 
with the lower tier metropolitan district authorities. Work on bus quality corridor 
measures occurs in partnership between METRO, the district authorities and the 
bus operators. Implementation issues include local political difficulties with the 
reallocation of road space and concerns over the negative image to business and 
developers of road pricing and parking strategies. Authorities do not have 
complete control over all parking in city centres which further compounds the 
difficulty of developing a coherent demand management strategy. In Leeds for 
example, almost one half of all parking spaces are private non-residential parking 
spaces and the City Council only has control over 17% of all city centre parking 
spaces. One option open to authorities in England but not Scotland is to introduce 
a workplace parking levy where businesses over a certain size are charged a fee 
for each parking space they have.  
 
The City of Edinburgh has control over all aspects of demand management 
policies including parking controls and pricing, congestion charging and road 
space reallocation. Of these options, it is only obliged to submit congestion 
charging to a public inquiry. Despite getting its proposed congestion charging 
scheme through a public inquiry, a recent referendum on the scheme found 74% 
opposition to the scheme on a very high (62%) turnout and the proposed scheme 
has been abandoned (Gaunt et al, 2006). 
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Table 3: Responsibility for Policy Instruments 
Policy Instrument London London 
Borough 
West 
Yorkshire 
PTE 
District 
Council 
Edinburgh 
National roads ? ? ? ? ? 
Non-national strategic 
roads ? ? ? ? ? 
Local roads ? ? ? ? ? 
Strategic Direction on 
rail ? ? ? ? ? 
Surface rail service 
specification ? ? ? ? ? 
Surface rail fares ? ? ?a ? ? 
Bus service levels ? ? ?b ? ?b 
Bus fares ? ? ?b ? ?b 
Light rail service levels ? ? ? ? ? 
Light rail faresc ? ? ? ? ? 
Supporting socially 
necessary bus services ? ? ? ? ? 
Infrastructure provision ? ? ?d ? ? 
Congestion charging ? ? ? ? ? 
Workplace parking levy ? ? ? ? ? 
Parking pricing ? ? ? ? ? 
Reallocation of 
roadspace ? ? ? ? ? 
Parking enforcemente ? ? ? ? ? 
Planning for major 
developments ? ? ? ? ? 
Information provision ? ? ? ? ? 
Awareness campaigns ? ? ? ? ? 
a The PTE has influence over fares in the area but not total control 
b Powers are available but not deemed practicable or affordable for influencing commercial 
services. Powers are used for non-commercial ‘socially necessary’ service provision 
c In practice the specification of fares is unlikely to be included in a contract but that right exists. 
d METRO supports the introduction of new infrastructure and is responsible for bus shelters. 
However, implementation of new tram/bus schemes is the responsibility of the MDC as highway 
authority. 
e This refers to control over public spaces. Not all public parking spaces are owned by Boroughs 
or local authorities and this does not include private, non-residential spaces. Powers do exist to 
license non-authority owned public car parks. 
 
Infrastructure 
Implementation in London is through Transport for London (on the strategic road 
network and on bespoke systems such as trams and the underground) and the 
London Boroughs (on local roads). In West Yorkshire infrastructure is largely the 
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responsibility of the Metropolitan District Councils. Detailed approval is required 
from central government for schemes over £5 million in value. Exceptions to this 
include bus and tram transport projects which are jointly promoted by METRO 
and Metropolitan Districts. Projects within the City of Edinburgh boundaries are 
promoted by the City Council. Increasingly, delivery of major schemes is carried 
out by Transport Initiatives Edinburgh as described earlier. Parliamentary 
approval is also required from the Scottish Parliament for major schemes.  
 
The main exceptions to this are enhancements to the rail network that have been 
mostly led by the Strategic Rail Authority and Network Rail across the case study 
sites. In West Yorkshire however, METRO has led investment on the rail network 
for services of sub-regional importance such as the electrification of the 
Wharfedale/Airedale lines where rail mode share has risen (JMP, 2004). An 
example of difficulties in negotiating across organisations was given by METRO: 
 
“It took 9 years to agree to the £2.5 million scheme to put a bus station outside the 
front of Leeds Bus Station. It took 6 months to build” (METRO officer) 
 
6. Funding 
There are many sources of funding available to the different conurbations. It is not 
possible to review them all here (see Pedler et al, 2004 for a complete review). 
This section discusses the principal sources of funding currently available in each 
of the three conurbations. 
 
Transport for London receives a block capital grant from central government that 
is renewed on a three yearly basis. It receives revenue from public transport 
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receipts, the congestion charge and a precept on the council tax charged by 
London Boroughs to their residents. A key issue raised particularly by Transport 
for London and the Mayor relates to the provision of funding to take forward 
major schemes. The schemes are of such a size (e.g. estimates of the cost of a 
cross-London East-West rail line are around £10 billion) that central government 
support is necessary. Transport for London has recently proposed, with Treasury 
backing, a bond issue with investment institutions and pension funds for around 
£200 million to take forward other major infrastructure investments as part of a 
plan to raise £3 billion through long-term debt. 
 
In West Yorkshire, the Passenger Transport Authority receives the capital grant 
from central government to distribute to the metropolitan districts and METRO in 
line with the local transport plan (in 2004 this was almost £54 million). Each 
district receives revenue grant funding direct from central government and levies a 
council tax on its residents. There is a precept agreed by the districts with the 
Passenger Transport Authority to fund the activities of METRO. METRO also 
receives some revenue funding direct from central government for rail services. 
The districts also receive income from parking charges and enforcement. 
 
The City of Edinburgh relies to a great extent on grant funding provided by the 
Scottish Executive with funding in 2003-04 at £33 million. The revenue budget 
available for maintenance and support of public transport services is around £5 
million per year. Had the congestion charging scheme been taken forward it 
would have generated over £45 million per year in net income for expenditure on 
either capital or revenue support (City of Edinburgh Council, 2004). 
 22
 7. Synthesis of results 
This section presents the conclusions on the hypotheses that were set out at the 
beginning of the project in the light of the evidence presented above and the 
responses to the interviews. 
 
Institutional change is more likely to disrupt effective policy implementation 
than to facilitate it 
The evidence to support this hypothesis is mixed. In London, for example, the 
creation of a Mayor with significant executive powers for transport has brought 
about substantial changes to transport policy. In particular, there has been the 
introduction of congestion charging, policies to freeze bus fares and to expand 
provision of services across the network. The creation of the Mayor and a 
transport body responsible for bus, underground and with significant road traffic 
responsibilities has allowed the development of a radical new policy (congestion 
charging) that had not been implemented through the previous administrative 
arrangements despite many years of discussion. 
 
By contrast, the City of Edinburgh, in response to the Scottish Executive’s 
consultation on changes to the organisation of transport in Scotland stated “There 
is no acknowledgement within the consultation paper of the considerable 
disruption that any reorganisation of transport delivery services will cause or how 
this will slow up the rate of project delivery and implementation of the Local 
Transport Strategy…. Local government reorganisation in 1996 was a prime 
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example of how progress is affected before, during and for a considerable time 
after, any large scale reorganisation…” (City of Edinburgh Council, 2003, p5). 
 
All of the respondents indicated that any major institutional reorganisation took 
around two or three years to settle down. New cultures have to be developed and 
there is a significant risk of a loss of accrued knowledge and strategic thinking as 
new contacts and relationships are developed. The benefits of any organisational 
change should therefore be shown to outweigh these costs. 
 
A single conurbation authority, with lower tier authorities responsible for 
detailed implementation, is more effective than separate, potentially 
competing single tier authorities 
On balance, the evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. Where there 
are two or more administrative boundaries within a significant travel to work area, 
there is potential for unfavourable policy outcomes as a result of local political 
differences. Respondents in West Yorkshire were keen to stress the necessity of 
co-ordinated public transport across the conurbation and the greater difficulties 
that would be encountered were this to be left to five individual District Councils. 
In Edinburgh, the congestion charging proposals split adjacent authorities within 
the Edinburgh travel to work area because of proposed exemptions for Edinburgh 
residents which were not going to be made available to residents of neighbouring 
authorities. 
 
Although the hypothesis is broadly supported it is important to highlight that the 
existence of a conurbation authority also has some limitations. Local political 
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pressures relating particularly to economic development make the application of 
measures to limit road traffic difficult to apply uniformly. Where joint budgetary 
agreement is required there is scope for lowest common denominator outcomes to 
occur as appears to have been the case with the budget setting of the West 
Yorkshire Passenger Transport Authority. 
 
One interviewee with experience of working under a variety of institutional 
settings outside and, over the past two decades, within London suggested that: 
 
“The most important aspects are for organisations to have clear objectives and a 
clear remit – executive powers are essential – standards and strategy are not 
enough” (Independent consultant) 
 
The split between local government and private sector operators is a 
significant barrier to the implementation of public transport improvements 
This discussion focuses on the split between local government and the private 
sector with regard to bus use. In most cities, the bus is the main alternative to the 
private car for most journeys.  
 
Concerns were expressed in West Yorkshire about the lack of influence over bus 
services. This is perhaps natural where an organisation exists whose remit is to co-
ordinate public transport services but whose powers are limited to concessionary 
fare arrangements, co-ordinating information and some ticketing and providing 
socially necessary services. Despite substantial successes in the development of 
bus quality partnerships across the area, METRO felt that the current network 
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remained unsatisfactory. In particular, there is a tension between the sort of bus 
network that would be run to maximise profits and that which would provide a 
network of ‘socially desirable’ services. These tensions are further highlighted by 
the requirements for local authorities in England to develop an accessibility plan 
from early 2006. These plans are intended to focus attention on improving access 
to key services and facilities (such as supermarkets, education sites and hospitals) 
to those least well served by car and existing public transport (DfT, 2004). 
 
“There are 45 operators in the West Yorkshire area and there is a need to co-
ordinate amongst these. METRO sponsors 20% of the mileage run but is 
financially constrained and has very limited scope for bringing in new services” 
(METRO officer) 
 
The situation in a de-regulated environment can be contrasted to London where 
Transport for London is able to co-ordinate bus services by franchising services to 
private sector operators. It provided 10,000 extra seats in the morning peak prior 
to the introduction of congestion charging and can remove bus services that are 
directly competing with light rail schemes to maximise their effectiveness. The 
Mayor also has had a strong policy to freeze fares for buses in London – an 
approach that would not be adopted by the private sector. The Mayor therefore 
has powers to influence fares to achieve wider social objectives that cannot be met 
through a commercial approach. However, the current increase in the provision of 
services and the freeze on fares has not proved sustainable and the Mayor has 
recently announced a bus fare increase of 20% to reduce the shortfall in finances 
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from the bus network and to contribute to the funding of a £3bn spending plan 
over the five years to 2010 (Livingstone, 2004). 
 
It is not the split of responsibility between the public sector and the private sector 
operators that is the barrier to the improvement of bus services. The main 
differences occur as a result of the split between a franchised and de-regulated 
market. In both cases provision is by the private sector. There are significant 
differences in the extent to which the co-ordinating transport authority can 
influence the services on offer, their quality and price. A franchise system offers 
all of these possibilities whereas a deregulated environment is limited in the extent 
to which it can influence services and there is no influence on price. Several 
studies have shown these two elements to be central to the development of 
sustainable strategies (e.g. May et al, 2005 and Lautso, 2004). In a deregulated 
environment, improvements to the most important bus routes in cities have been 
made through partnership between local authorities and bus companies with some 
impressive results along particular corridors. The improvements are however 
narrow in focus and restricted to routes with high rates of return, thus falling some 
way short of the policy flexibility available in London. 
 
More generally, institutional barriers are more severe for some types of 
policy instrument than others 
The generality of this hypothesis means that, by definition, this statement has to 
be true. This section therefore identifies those instruments that appear to be most 
strongly affected by institutional barriers. Four key areas are listed (and bus 
service operation is discussed above). 
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 New infrastructure 
Glaister et al (2004) conducted a comparison of funding mechanisms for 
infrastructure in major cities across the world. They identified the strong degree of 
central government control over spending in the UK as a major barrier to progress 
in the UK with any project over £5 million subject to detailed centralised scrutiny. 
This view was shared by many of the interviewees. 
 
Road space reallocation 
Road space reallocation involves handing over some road space that was 
previously used by all road users to specific groups (bus users, pedestrians or 
cyclists). The negative impacts of such measures fall to a small group of easily 
identified individuals (typically shop keepers that lose parking outside their 
businesses). By contrast, the benefits of bus lanes fall to a group of people that are 
widely dispersed. The benefits may also be small (perhaps one minute per 
journey) and therefore insufficient to attract support. 
 
Pricing measures 
Concerns exist over parking pricing policies in towns and cities and the extent to 
which increases in one area will lead to reductions in trade and loss of business to 
adjacent competing centres. The potential for the use of parking pricing as a 
policy instrument is further weakened by the presence of substantial amounts of 
private non-residential parking and authorities’ control of a limited proportion of 
the public parking places. 
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The difficulties of parking policy appear small when compared with the 
challenges of introducing congestion charging. There are a number of barriers 
including developing a political will, perception of the problem amongst the 
business and residents of the city, availability of high quality public transport 
alternatives and high scheme operating costs that need to be overcome before 
cities such as Leeds in West Yorkshire are likely to pursue such an option 
seriously (Mackie and Marsden, 2005). As described earlier, the City of 
Edinburgh Council has recently abandoned a proposed double cordon scheme for 
the city. This leaves the scheme in central London as the only major 
implementation of the congestion charging powers. Central London is unlike any 
other city centre in the UK with unique attractions, public transport accessibility 
and work opportunities.  
 
Instruments requiring revenue funding support 
The availability of revenue support for the design, maintenance and promotion of 
the transport system is perceived to be a significant barrier at all of the three sites. 
Problems brought about as a result of a lack of revenue include unaffordable on-
going maintenance costs and cuts to socially necessary bus services. Spending on 
behaviour change and educational campaigns also comes from this income 
stream. Evidence suggests that to be effective, such initiatives require intensive 
application (Cairns et al, 2004). The lack of revenue funding therefore appears to 
act as a barrier to the adoption of policies that will, in the longer term, act to 
reduce dependence on the private car. 
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As a result, institutional barriers are most severe in their impact on 
integrated strategies 
Extensive investigation into the development of optimal transport strategies 
carried out through the OPTIMA and FATIMA EU research projects found that 
the following three elements were typical of those found in the optimal strategies 
for the nine cities tested: 
• “improvements in public transport frequencies and/or fares; 
• increases in the cost of car use; and 
• low cost improvements in road capacity.” (May et al, 2000)  
 
In each of the institutional settings reviewed in this paper no one body has the 
power to influence each of these elements across the whole area of administrative 
responsibilities. As the review demonstrates, London has the greatest powers of 
influence over these matters and is perceived to have developed the most 
integrated approach to demand management and improving public transport 
conditions.  Edinburgh and West Yorkshire appear to be making more limited and 
incremental progress towards integrated demand management strategies. This 
hypothesis is almost certainly true. 
 
While it is possible to develop integrated strategies which can be 
implemented within the context of split institutional responsibilities, they are 
likely to be less effective 
This hypothesis has been supported by the evidence from these case studies. The 
presence of a clear process and mandate for change in London appears, alongside 
strong political leadership, to have acted as a catalyst for change in the way that 
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transport policy is being delivered in London. The City of Edinburgh Council 
believes that its position as a unitary authority has made it more effective as a 
transport delivery unit than under the previous regional arrangements. As the 
focus of regional strategy, Edinburgh can negotiate with regional partners from a 
position of strength. 
 
West Yorkshire highlights some of the difficulties of split responsibilities across 
several organisations and the complex institutional arrangements that exist to 
achieve change. There are many stakeholders to influence including transport 
providers but few strong levers to do so. There are substantial differences between 
the objectives of the different organisations and this creates tensions in the policy 
development and implementation process. The large shared travel to work area 
multiplies the complexity of the interactions and can lead to lowest common 
denominator approaches to funding and policy making.  
 
These findings appear to mirror those of Docherty’s comparison of rail policy in 
Merseytravel and Strathclyde. There, a single local authority organisation with 
responsibility for transport delivery across the whole of Strathclyde bypassed 
some of the more technocratic negotiation procedures required for investment at 
Merseytravel where agreements were required across multiple district councils 
(Docherty, 2000). 
 
Where there are split responsibilities between local authorities it is more 
difficult to resolve the conflicts between environmental and economic 
development objectives 
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The evidence to support this hypothesis is weak. There is integration of economic 
development, regional spatial strategy and transport strategy and delivery in 
London.  Respondents were generally highly critical of the extent to which the 
strategies were integrated or indeed capable of resolving the problems that exist. 
One respondent noted that these were hugely complex issues that were not really 
understood, concluding that perhaps this was “all just too difficult” (TfL Board 
Member). Rydin et al (2004) provide further evidence of conflicts between the 
environment and planning domains of the Greater London Authority. 
 
Outside of London, cities and local authorities compete not just with their 
immediate neighbours but also with other city regions in the same country and, 
particularly in the case of London, internationally. The respondents all indicated 
that economic development concerns appear to be strongly driving regional and 
local strategies and this is a context within which transport and environmental 
issues need to be resolved.  
 
“There is no political support for parking charging to extend beyond the main 
towns. Other towns are struggling economically and tend to have time-limited free 
parking” (Metropolitan District Council) 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has reported the results of an investigation of the effects of institutional 
structure on transport policy making in three UK cities with very different current 
institutional arrangements and past experience.  It is important to stress that these 
cities are not necessarily representative, and that there are other institutional 
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structures in the UK which were not examined.  A series of hypotheses was tested, 
adopting a positivist approach, based on desk studies and interviews.  The 
conclusions and policy implications from these hypothesis tests are set out below.  
Given the limited coverage of the case studies, these conclusions may merit 
further testing. 
 
The organisation of local government has changed several times in the UK over 
recent decades. The nature of responsibilities and geographical coverage in 
transport is now quite different from that three decades ago. There is evidence to 
support the idea that changes in organisation and responsibilities do negatively 
affect the ability to deliver policy as new relationships are formed and new 
powers taken up. The costs of such disruption need to be fully justified by the 
benefits of the institutional changes proposed. 
 
The evidence generally supports the case for a conurbation-wide authority, and 
horizontal integration, as advocated by the European Commission.  London’s 
ability to develop a coherent strategy contrasts with the tensions which arose in 
pursuing the failed congestion charging scheme in Edinburgh.  West Yorkshire’s 
experience with the development of a single Local Transport Plan also indicates 
the benefits of conurbation-wide authorities, as well as the weaknesses of having 
second tier authorities each of which needs to be satisfied by the resulting pattern 
of investment.  On balance it is probably more appropriate to invest all strategic 
transport and land use responsibilities in the higher tier authority. 
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The involvement of the private sector in service provision is not a barrier to 
strategy delivery in itself.  Indeed, there is ample evidence that the business 
acumen of the private sector can deliver much more efficient services.  The 
distinction drawn, instead, is between the franchising model operating 
successfully in London, and the deregulated environment in West Yorkshire and 
Edinburgh.  Both the latter cities find it difficult to influence bus service levels, 
and almost impossible to determine fare levels.  By contrast, London has been 
able to maintain and enhance the bus network, and to introduce lower and simpler 
fare structures.  There is a strong case for introducing the franchising model 
elsewhere in the UK.   
 
Almost inevitably, institutional barriers impact more severely on some policy 
instruments than others.  The research identified two types of barrier: those 
related to finance and those concerning public acceptability.  There is no clear 
justification for some types of policy instrument being more difficult to fund than 
others, always provided that they are shown to represent good value for money.  
Since revenue projects are usually less expensive, there is a danger that they will 
be overlooked in favour of more expensive and less cost-effective alternatives.  
Acceptability barriers particularly limited the take-up of road space reallocation 
and pricing measures.  It is debatable whether simpler institutional structures 
would overcome these problems, except to the extent that there are fewer 
opportunities for disagreement between government bodies. 
 
Since the most important instruments in an integrated strategy are likely to be 
public transport service levels and fares, controls on car use and land use policies, 
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and the implementation of the first and second of these are made more difficult 
by the barriers identified, at least outside London, it is inevitable that the resulting 
strategies will be less effective.  
 
In summary, despite several attempts at local government reorganisation in the 
UK, this study has highlighted continuing institutional barriers to the pursuit of 
sustainable urban transport strategies, and a particular need to develop 
conurbation-wide authorities, to introduce franchise-based management of public 
transport services and fares, and to avoid inconsistencies in the allocation of 
finance to larger capital schemes and to revenue-funded projects.  However, the 
experience from London suggests that a combination of the right powers and 
institutional structure, flexible funding and a strong political champion can 
achieve significant improvements in a short period of time.  This alone may 
justify the disruption from a further set of institutional changes. 
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